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Abstract 
While Romanticism, psychoanalysis and postmodern theory have 
provided the dominant paradigms for understanding creativity in the 
humanities in the past century, this paper argues that 
interdisciplinary engagement with sociobiology and the cognitive 
sciences might provide ground-breaking perspectives. Against the 
‘supra-rational’, masculinist and solipsistic visions of creativity that 
have prevailed, the work of the sociobiologist Ellen Dissanayake and 
of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio invite new ways of thinking 
about the role of the feeling body, femininity and mutuality in 
creative practice. This paper will survey Dissanayake’s and 
Damasio’s research to explore the possibility and desirability of a 
paradigm shift when it comes to understanding creativity, with poetry 
as a strategic focus for its argument. This paper is not interested in 
putting forward a new methodology for writing poetry but in 
recognising the embodied condition from which all poetry 
fundamentally arises.
Keywords: theorising creativity, poetry, science 
Introduction
It was upon studying WB Yeats’s poem ‘Long-legged Fly’ as a high-
school-literature student that I was introduced to a mystical, ‘supra-
rational’ theory of poetic creativity. The poem portrays Julius Caesar, 
Helen of Troy and Michelangelo channeling a mysterious and quiet 
genius as they work, in their respective ways, at preparing a battle 
plan, being beautiful and painting the Sistine chapel. Each stanza 
ends with the refrain: ‘Like a long-legged fly upon the stream / His 
[or Her] mind moves upon silence.’As a student I found the poem 
ethereal and compelling. However, what interests me now is the 
poem’s mobilisation of an enduring mythos of creative practice. 
That mythos of creativity, intimately associated with Romanticism, 
might be said to have three tropes, each of which inhere in Yeats’s 
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post-Romantic poem. To begin with, the poem’s stanzaic refrain 
highlights how creativity is identified with the Wordsworthian 
faculty of the mysterious and imaginative ‘mind’. While the feeling 
body was indubitably important to the Romantics, who opposed 
Enlightenment rationalism and Cartesian dualism, their numinous 
conceptualisation of the imagination often resulted in a paradoxical 
disembodiment of the creative ‘spirit’. As Timothy Clark writes in 
The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis in Romantic and 
Post-Romantic Writing, Romantic inspiration is ‘less irrational 
than ... “supra-rational”’ (Clark 1997: 2) – the term adopted by this 
paper. Notably, in Yeats’s poem the body becomes something barely 
present, as the tenuous image of the long-legged fly suggests. 
Secondly, the poem makes apparent that creativity is associated with 
the masculine. While the beautiful Helen is included, she is a ‘body’ 
of art rather than the creator of art. Caesar and Michelangelo, by 
contrast, engender war strategies and religious paintings through the 
mysterious potency of their minds.  Finally, it is also notable that the 
men’s creative practice occurs in solitude, though it seems to connect 
with a shared resource or mystical tradition of sorts. Indeed, the poem 
delivers a rhetorical plea for audiences not to disturb the creative 
genius at his solitary work.
Contemporary theories of creativity, as Clark suggests, continue to 
engage this Romantic mythos, with writers’ self-descriptions of the 
creative process being particularly ‘notorious for accommodating 
romantic myths of creativity’ (Clark 1997: 9), which effectively self-
validate their own creative activity. Nevertheless, as Thomas Busse 
and Richard Mansfield indicate in their survey of creativity research 
(Busse & Mansfield 1980), psychoanalytic or psychological studies 
have become the norm. Albert Rothenberg argues that the 
unconscious is ‘invoked more frequently in connection with 
creativity than with almost any other human actions or 
experience’ (Rothenberg 1990: 48). However, for Rothenberg, the 
‘belief in the unconscious roots of creativity’, like Romantic 
explanations of inspiration, forms ‘a mystique.’ Indeed, 
psychoanalytic accounts of creativity remain intimately bound up 
with Romantic thought – which should come as no surprise given that 
Romanticism, with its interest in the irrational and the individual, 
essentially ‘invented’ psychoanalysis (Faflak 2007).
In both Jungian and Freudian theory the unconscious appears as a 
primordial and mysterious force that powerfully informs art (from 
Oedipus Rex through to Wagner’s Ring Cycle). Jung and the 
Freudian Surrealists (if not Freud himself) pursued strategies for 
producing art by tapping into the unconscious mind in much the same 
way as Yeats’s geniuses are shown communing with some 
imaginative intelligence. Psychoanalysis acknowledges the body as 
the source of the unconscious desires and fears that inform creativity, 
but it views the body ambiguously, with Freud’s case studies relying 
heavily on the putatively irrational and expressive bodies of women. 
 Indeed, contemporary psychoanalytic explanations of creativity 
salvage the unconscious as a kind of masculine ‘supra-rational’ force; 
they promote, as Clark puts it, a masculine ‘Romantic Orphian’ myth 
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of creativity in which the individual ventures into the ‘hidden 
“depths” of the mind’ to achieve ‘a privileged mode of consciousness 
that overcomes Cartesian dualism’ (Clark 1997: 29). In this way, the 
three patterns of Romantic creativity identified earlier still linger in 
psychoanalytic thinking: the mind is mystified; the masculine is the 
creative force; and the individual creator is presented as heroic. 
The repetition of such patterns, which we might trace to longer-
standing theories of creativity espoused in classical and Renaissance 
contexts, as outlined in studies such as John Moffitt’s Inspiration: 
Bacchus and the Cultural History of a Creation Myth (2005), 
suggests a certain stasis or stalemate in thinking. This has not been 
entirely challenged by postmodern epistemologies. For instance, 
Marjorie Perloff’s Unoriginal Genius (2010) may contest the 
Romantic mythos of individual creativity in poetry by highlighting 
citation over originality. However, the Derridean concept of language 
and creativity informing Perloff’s work can be viewed as cognitively 
idealist (if not ‘supra-rationalist’) and implicitly masculinist – 
something that the work of Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray 
addresses.  
Clark’s study usefully historicises the Romantic mythos of creativity 
– and its subsequent variations – by evoking the rise of the bourgeois 
individual subject and the absence of the material audience/reader, on 
whom a powerful rhetorical effect is strategically imagined (1997: 
30). Clark also brilliantly notes the estranging effects of transitioning 
from writing to self-reading during the creative process, which he 
argues leads to the sense of a ‘fissure or hiatus in the structure of 
subjectivity’ (19) and to the ‘experience that meaning is always 
elsewhere’. His thesis is that ‘effects that seem psychic, internal or 
psychological are often determined by the material parameters of 
composition’ (40). Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Clark’s 
argument, the ‘supra-rational’, patriarchal and solipsistic ideologies 
in theories of creativity might also warrant a different approach, 
which involves not just a materialist critique of traditional ways of 
theorising creativity but a genuinely refreshed epistemological 
approach – an approach that might theorise the significance of the 
feeling body to the creative act (something overlooked in Clark’s 
focus on textuality), and that might acknowledge femininity and 
audiences as fundamentally implicated in the creative process. 
This paper, inspired by the ground-breaking interdisciplinary work of 
Kevin Brophy in the area of creative writing, explores the possibility 
of achieving such reinvigoration through forays into disciplines 
outside the humanities. New, empirically based work in the fields of 
sociobiology and the cognitive sciences provides the potential for 
understanding creativity in ways that challenge myths of inspiration 
associated with the ‘supra-rational’, the masculine and the individual. 
This paper will focus, in particular, on the work of the sociobiologist 
Ellen Dissanayake and of the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio to 
investigate the importance of feeling, the feminine and sociality to 
the creative process. It will also take poetry as its focus, with the aim 
not of establishing a new methodology for writing poetry but of 
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recognising the embodied condition from which poetry – regardless 
of what form it may take – arises.
A note on interdisciplinarity
It is worth mentioning, as a further and final preliminary to this 
paper, that while interdisciplinarity is becoming increasingly popular, 
the relationship between the humanities and the sciences has been 
fraught. While not wishing to be polemical and ‘take sides’, I am 
nevertheless traversing a terrain of conflict in which I need to situate 
myself in under to be properly understood.
The 1990s, in conjunction with the ‘culture wars’, saw the emergence 
in the US of the so-called ‘science wars’, during which humanities 
and science scholars fought over which side might claim greater 
knowledge of human ‘nature’ (Ross 1996). The conflict was 
triggered, in part, by the emergence of the interdisciplinary area of 
science criticism, influenced by the humanities, which exposed how 
the empirical work of science was compromised by its allegiance to 
dominant ideologies and vested interests. Some scientists responded 
to this challenge to their objectivity and authority by discrediting the 
humanities, mocking postmodern relativism and ideological criticism 
in particular. In a 1996 hoax, the physicist Alan Sokal published a 
paper in the humanities journal Social Text, in which he satirically 
argued that quantum gravity was a social and linguistic construct 
(Sokal 2000).  In 1998 EO Wilson advocated for ‘consilience’ or 
disciplinary convergence, heralding the inevitable and desirable 
replacement of misguided humanities epistemologies with scientific 
ones (Wilson 1998). In Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human 
Nature, and Literature, Joseph Carroll presents a provocative version 
of Wilson’s case: 
In the humanities, scholars happily confident of their 
own avant-garde creativity continue to repeat the 
formulas of Freud, Marx, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss – 
formulas that have now been obsolete, in their own 
fields, for decades. It is as if one were to visit a country 
in which the hosts happily believed themselves on the 
cutting edge of technological innovation and, in support 
of this belief, proudly displayed a rotary-dial phone, a 
manual type-writer, and a mimeograph machine. 
(Carroll 2004: x)
Carroll hails the inevitable conquest of literary studies in particular 
by sociobiology and looks forward to a future in which literary texts 
will be assessed not for their ideological values but for whether or not 
they realistically reflect ‘human nature’. Jonathan Gottschall, the 
author of Literature, Science, and a New Humanities, similarly 
declares that moving ‘closer to the sciences in theory, method, and 
governing ethos’ is ‘the only responsible and attractive correction of 
course … with the potential to lift the field from its 
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morass’ (Gottschall 2008: 3). Providing a model of the future of 
literary studies, Gottschall claims to restore ‘dignity’ to The Iliad by 
reading it as ‘a drama of naked apes’ (Gottschall & Sloan Wilson 
2005: xvii) – male ones at any rate. 
I am not completely unsympathetic to concerns about the static 
nature of humanities scholarship, as my own frustration with the 
limitations of theories of creativity when it comes to literature 
suggests. However, the ‘progressive’ vision of Darwinian evolution 
that Wilson et al advocate as a universal paradigm itself comprises an 
outdated discourse, consistent with the retrograde ideologies of 
patriarchy, white supremacy and capitalism. Indeed, revisionary 
evolutionary scientists such as Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan 
reject neo-Darwinists such as Wilson, Carroll and Gottschall as ‘a 
minor, twentieth-century sect’ (Margulis & Sagan 1997: 281). 
Contrary to the rhetoric of masculine competition and genetic 
determinism that neo-Darwinists employ, current science locates life 
in mutuality and struggle, and in complex and heterogeneous systems 
that give rise to ‘interactive emergence’ (Oyama 2000: 65) 
While nature/nurture debates, typically mobilised by neo-Darwinists 
to uphold some ideological model of human nature, are given media 
attention, science has also moved beyond such simplifications. As 
Russell Gray argues, outlining Susan Oyama’s development systems 
theory, the two categories of genes/environment, nature/nurture or 
innate/learned: 
expand, interamify, and coalesce, and thus cease to be 
meaningful. All phenotypes are the joint product of 
internal and external factors. Development is one 
process requiring many inputs linked together by 
complex, nonlinear, dynamic systems. It cannot be 
realistically chopped in two. (Gray 1997: 390)
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch point out, for 
instance, how the ultraviolet vision of bees and ultraviolent reflective 
patterns of flowers suggest a ‘mutual enfoldment view of life and 
world’ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1997: 200). Even non-
behavioural characteristics such as height and bone density rely on 
environmental inputs (such as nutrition or gravity) as much as genetic 
ones. Life is always embedded in multiple developmental systems, 
which include society and culture. 
It remains the case, however, that despite valuing the work of 
Dissanayake and Damasio – which I will situate in the revisionary 
context just articulated when I come to outlining their theories below 
– I am no advocate of consilience. I share John Adams’s concerns 
about the detrimental effect of ‘methodological monism across the 
disciplinary spectrum’ (Adams 2007: 134). However, what science 
can offer is precisely a challenge to the ‘methodological monism’ of 
the humanities – just as the revisionary evolutionary science 
referenced above undoubtedly derives in part from humanities 
interventions. While disciplinary specificities provide genuine 
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obstacles to mutual understanding, we might find ourselves inspired 
and reinvigorated by attempts at exchange.
As Brophy has already demonstrated in the area of creative writing, 
interdisciplinary engagement can lead to fresh and exciting shifts in 
perspective. In Patterns of Creativity, Brophy calls attention to the 
ways in which the ‘bewildering diversity of hypotheses, trials, 
variations and follies that the process of evolution has manifested on 
the planet’ (Brophy 2009: 18) find productive parallels in the excess, 
spontaneity, provisionality and unpredictability of human creativity. 
What Brophy introduces here is the potential for a paradigm shift in 
thinking about creative practice. In this paper, I similarly hope to 
canvas the possibility of theorising creativity in ways that move 
beyond (whether that is to challenge or supplement) a tradition of 
thought within humanities scholarship.
Dissanayake: the origins of creativity in ‘motherese’
While there is, as Gemma Corradi Fiumara reminds us, an enduring 
Cartesian tradition of conceptualising emotions as forces that ‘cloud 
the vision of the intellect’ (Fiumara 2001: 37), feelings have 
undergone a significant reevaluation in the humanities in recent 
times. In literary studies, for instance, we have seen the so-called 
‘ethical turn’, which ascribes morally useful empathy-raising powers 
to books. The trend tends towards idealising literary feeling as a civic 
virtue (as we see in the work of Martha Nussbaum, 1995). However, 
there has also been the less didactic ‘affective turn’, challenging New 
Criticism’s sanctioning of detached masculine appraisal over 
feminine absorption when it comes to reading. The ARC Centre of 
Excellence for the History of Emotions in Melbourne is a major 
initiative in this research area. In the discipline of creative writing, 
there are studies such as Albert Rothenberg’s Creativity and 
Madness: New Findings and Old Stereotypes (1990) and Daniel 
Nettle’s Strong Imagination: Madness, Creativity and Human Nature
(2001), which reassess the role of emotion vis-à-vis the production of 
literature – although such studies might be seen as continuing a more 
long-standing trend of psychoanalytic or psychological 
interpretations of creativity.
Such shifts in the humanities are inseparable from scientific studies 
demonstrating how our affective life, as Fiumara argues, cannot be 
compartmentalised away from our ratiocinative capabilities: emotion 
and cognition are ‘based on continuities and transformations than on 
some conceptual taxonomy’ (Fiumara 2001: 65). Emotions are a 
primary and ‘important source of knowledge’ (79), triggering 
attention and action, and they underlie every ‘rational’ decision we 
might make. Indeed, emotions form the constant, if changing, 
weather of our bodies. Importantly for this paper, Fiumara describes 
language – often associated with cognitive values in the Western 
philosophical tradition – as part of the ‘affective reality in which we 
live and operate’ (65). 
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It is a vision of language that makes immediate phenomenological 
sense to me as a poet. It also resonates with the Romantic and 
psychoanalytic understanding of poetic creativity as a ‘supra-
rational’ (if mystified) experience, and while it contrasts with the 
postmodern emphasis on textuality, understanding affectivity as the 
foundation of our language experience is hardly undermined by a 
postmodern self-conscious repudiation of feeling, as I will argue 
shortly. This affective vision of language is also one elaborated on by 
the sociobiologist Dissanayake, whose work comprises a notable 
contribution to the scientific reassessment of emotion referred to 
above and, as I will now argue, an exciting interdisciplinary 
intervention when it comes to theorising creativity, particularly in 
relation to poetry. 
Dissanayake’s research highlights the fundamental significance of 
feeling to our cultural endeavours, draws attention to the role of 
women when it comes to nurturing feeling, and highlights the 
significance of mutual rather than individual feeling. Indeed, relying 
on a revisionary sociobiological methodology, she grounds creativity 
not in the imaginative faculty of men of original genius, but in 
maternal emotion and mutuality. 
In Art and Intimacy: How the Arts Began, Dissanayake begins by 
defining art in terms of its emotional effect on audiences, comparing 
it with love. Love and art, she writes, ‘grasp us utterly and transport 
us from ordinary sweating, flailing, imperfect “reality” to an 
indescribable realm where we know and seem known by the 
sensibility of another, united in a continuing present, our usual 
isolation momentarily effaced’ (Dissanayake 2000: 4). She then 
traces the ‘origins and interconnections of the felt rhythms and modes 
of love and art … to … the earliest months of individual infancy’ (9), 
locating art’s origins in the relationship between mother and child, 
and in the innate ‘sensitivities and capacities that predispose them to 
join in emotional communion’ (6). The first evidence of the mutual 
forces of love and art, Dissanayake argues, are to be found in ‘baby 
talk’ or ‘motherese’, which ‘is not the trivial or inane pastime that it 
might superficially seem but, rather, a cradle in which nascent 
psychosocial capacities can emerge and be developed’ (Dissanayake 
2001: 336). Motherese is, for Dissanayake, the ‘mutual multimedia 
ritual performance’ (2000: 29) that emerges in the first months of 
infancy and motherhood, and that achieves its effects ‘through 
fundamentally aesthetic means’: ‘stylization (formalization or 
simplification), repetition, exaggeration, and elaboration in visual, 
vocal, and gestural modalities’ (2001: 336). During this multimedia 
performance, mother and infant collaborate in a routine of sound-
making and face-pulling, the excitable mirror neurons in their brains 
compelling them to imitate one another’s sounds and expressions so 
that they achieve what Dissanayake describes as an ‘emotional 
communion’ (Dissanayake 2000: 6). 
Dissanayake is explicit in contesting the cognitive bias of traditional 
accounts of language development. She argues that love and art, like 
the condition of infancy from which they arise, are ‘intrinsically 
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nonverbal’ (Dissanayake 2000: 6) and non-cognitive in the strict old-
fashioned sense of that term. While language, she argues, ‘will 
eventually become also an instrument of symbolic reasoning and 
intellectual analysis’, it first and foremost ‘expresses emotional needs 
of mutuality and belonging’ (45-6). In fact, for Dissanayake the 
emotional role of art remains paramount even in culture’s more 
mature manifestations, with ‘ceremonies or rituals’ – from church 
services to cinema viewing and concerts – doing for a society’s 
members ‘what mothers naturally do for babies: engage their interest, 
involve them in a shared rhythmic pulse, and thereby instill feelings 
of closeness and communion’ (64). Distinctions between the 
emotional and cognitive are always spurious, however, for that 
emotional communication is also profoundly – and not in any way 
idealistically – educative: ‘Far from creating a state of soporific 
oceanic bliss, the elements of mother-infant engagements … gain 
attention, guide emotions, and reinforce memory’ (142). Indeed, they 
lie behind our eventual interpellation into ideology and come to form 
one of the developmental systems from which human ‘nature’ 
dialectically emerges (with ‘nature’ being inextricable from an 
environment that includes ‘culture’, as I suggested earlier). 
To summarise, then, Dissanayake’s theory of creativity is 
fundamentally emotional; the capacity for emotion and therefore 
creativity is developed by the mother; and creativity is grounded in a 
mutuality that always presumes and invites an audience. Indeed, in 
regards to the last point, it is notable that Dissanayake’s 
conceptualisation of creativity does not attempt to separate the 
creator from the consumer; she never elevates the writer above the 
reader. Creativity is embedded in intersubjectivity rather than 
alienation – even if a feeling of alienation is what is being expressed. 
As we can see, Dissanayake contests the traditional mythos of 
creativity based on the mystical ‘supra-rational’ mind, the masculine 
and autonomy. However, it is her distance from humanities debates 
around creativity that gives her work its originality and rigour. 
Dissanayake is not writing back to Romanticism, psychoanalysis or 
postmodernism, which are not in her purview. Her theory of 
creativity relies on a vision of human ‘nature’ that is, as I have 
suggested, self-consciously revisionary, challenging the Cartesian, 
patriarchal and individualistic biases of traditional Darwinian 
evolutionary theory – something that is worth briefly addressing here.
Dissanayake understands human nature in terms of ‘psychological or 
emotional needs that arise from a primary capacity for mutuality’ 
rather than ‘competitive behavioral strategies that serve an 
underlying selfishness’ (Dissanayake 2000: 8). She argues: ‘the 
earliest ability of infants is to … engage in emotional communication 
with others. Each of us is born with a mind – sense and emotions – 
that moves us to seek and engage in intimacy with others before we 
do anything else’ (10). Presupposing an environment of health in 
which mutuality can flourish, that intimacy is expressed and 
elaborated on through art. Nevertheless, cruder scientific models of 
culture’s origins continue to rehearse the argument that, much as 
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male peacocks allegedly produce their elaborate tail feathers to attract 
plainer females, men produce art in order to captivate fertile women. 
Steven Pinker, one such theorist, is critical of what he describes as 
utopian ‘left-wing innatists’ (Pinker 2002: 305) such as Dissanayake 
and Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, who also argues that maternal empathy 
drove language acquisition (Blaffer Hrdy 2009: 38) and that culture 
originated in adaptive systems of mother-infant ‘mutual 
delight’ (163). However, Dissanayake’s emphasis on empathy and 
cooperation arguably provides a view of human evolution that is less 
naïve than traditional accounts privileging masculine competition for 
breeding rights. Dissanayake’s work ultimately acknowledges how 
much more there is at stake to human reproductive success and 
survival – to ‘fitness’ – than rivalry between men for mates. 
Successful reproduction involves something more sustained and 
significant than the procreative act: namely, parenting. This is where 
‘motherese’ – seen as the earliest form of ‘art’ – comes in, facilitating 
bonding and pleasure in a virtual performative space through the 
triggering and sharing of heightened emotion. It is also the case that, 
when it comes to understanding that subject dear to Neo-Darwinists, 
human nature, Dissanayake’s focus on infants and ‘the pre-
Paleolithic infancy of the human species’ (Dissanayake 2000: 6) 
makes more sense than focusing exclusively on the behaviors of 
grown males. 
Dissanayake’s vision of poetry as intrinsically linked with emotion 
also makes sense to me as a poet, as well as resonating with 
Romantic theories of creativity. There are many different styles of 
poetry and compositional methods, but poetry might nevertheless be 
defined as ‘originally lyric’, as a type of language that fundamentally 
relies on ‘feeling effects’ – even if those feeling effects might be 
deliberately minimised, as in some examples of postmodern poetry. 
Poetry is principally a form of language that, as Ronald Schleifer 
describes, revolves around ‘the phenomenal materiality of 
language’ (Schleifer 2009: 85). Poetry is, likewise for Derek 
Attridge, ‘a linguistic practice that specifically emphasizes the 
material properties of language … [that] provide pleasure and 
significance independently of cognitive content’ (Attridge 1988: 
130). Poetry is typically attuned to the ‘felt’ dimensions of language 
apparent in its rhythms, sounds, textures, and rhymes. Poetry is also 
commonly associated with connotative or suggestive, rather than 
denotative or instrumentalist, kinds of expression. All of this is to say 
that poetry, as the common complaint of students articulates, is not 
primarily about conveying a ‘rational’ sense of things – although it 
can, in a self-reflexively counterintuitive mode, adopt such 
approaches when it chooses. Indeed, poetry is a frequent – even 
formalised – response to experiences of emotional intensity that are 
difficult to cognitively process and articulate, such as love, pain, 
trauma, or grief. Poetry, with its reliance on ‘feeling effects’, 
suggestion, rhyme, and musicality, becomes an intuitive or self-
consciously employed resource for expression during deeply 
experienced ‘feeling events’ that do not translate easily into words. It 
is in this light that Schleifer describes poetry as a ‘primal cry’ for a 
state of expression ‘in which the distance between signifier and 
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signified, between sound and import, does not exist’ (Schleifer 2009: 
87); poetry pushes ‘toward the “rediscovered truth” of a simple rather 
than a double articulation’ (95). 
Poetry, as I have described it here, can be a profoundly moodful and 
intimate praxis. This could be why poetry sometimes feels ‘auto-
intoxicated’ (Moffitt 2005: 20), as representations of poetry from 
ancient Greece through to the contemporary day have it. Romantic 
and psychoanalytic theories of creativity might glorify poetry as the 
narcissistic exercise of the emotional genius. However, poetic 
attempts at expressing a felt experience of the world assume, as 
Dissanayake would argue, the presence of a ‘Virtual Mother’ (2000: 
48), an intimate, sympathetic audience ready to receive, recognise, 
mirror, and respond. Indeed, we might say that the act of writing 
poetry comes from the ‘Virtual Mother’; it is invited by a tradition of 
emotional creativity and communication that was instituted for us. 
Indeed, inspiration so often comes directly from reading poetry or 
participating in another moodful cultural stimulus, such that we feel 
prompted to express our emotional experience in reply. This 
resonates with Dissanayake’s description of the mother-infant 
cultural dynamic of ‘matching or imitating another person’s 
expressed states … thus making it possible to enter into or share the 
others’ feeling’ and to enhance ‘one’s own mood or state’ (40). 
In Patterns of Creativity Brophy quotes from a 1929 book by Mary 
Cecil Allen that notably addresses modern art’s non-figurative and 
expressionist tendencies. Cecil Allen asks an artist why she paints, 
and the artist responds: ‘Because things I see excite me and I want to 
reproduce this feeling’ (cited in Brophy 2009: 53). Brophy suggests 
that a similar emotion is basic to why he writes poetry, although he 
also notes how writing poetry is a highly self-conscious exercise. 
Because we write from a tradition, he argues, a poem is also always 
about poetry. Poetry’s self-reflexive intertextuality is why a poem 
can choose to strip itself of its emotionalism, inspired by particular 
philosophical or ideological fashions, as we see with some examples 
of pre-Romantic Classical verse or postmodern poetry. However, 
poetry, with its roots in orality, can be viewed as fundamentally about 
emotion, originally grounded in the maternal dyad of emotional 
communication, and intrinsically attached to the possibility of an 
intimate audience.
Damasio: creativity as an expression of the ‘embodied mind’
As we have seen, Dissanayake’s theory of art’s origin in motherese 
invites us to recognise emotion, a maternal context of intimacy, and 
mutuality as key features of creativity. Surveying Antonio Damasio’s 
research in neuroscience allows us to test these ideas from a different 
disciplinary vantage point. The discussion of Damasio’s work will 
rely on his theoretical articulations of his clinical research, rather than 
on his clinical research per se, because of the latter’s specificity. In 
popular science ‘trade books’ such as The Feeling of What Happens
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(Damasio 1999) and Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious 
Brain (Damasio 2012a), Damasio highlights the importance of 
emotion and feeling to the functioning of the modern brain and the 
existence of the conscious mind – that traditional seat of the self, so 
firmly associated with cognition in the Cartesian model. Indeed, in a 
2012 lecture for the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of 
Southern California (Damasio 2012b) – the seat of Damasio’s 
interdisciplinary research – like Dissanayake he locates the origin of 
creativity in a maternal context of emotional bonding. Damasio’s 
work therefore enables us to further demystify ‘supra-rationalist’, 
masculinist and alienated representations of the creative practitioner. 
Damasio’s research forms part of the ‘affective turn’ apparent even in 
the so-called cognitive sciences (a term used as a catch-all to include 
neuroscience, phenomenology, various branches of cognitive science, 
and consciousness studies). As F Elizabeth Hart explains:
whereas an earlier phase of cognitive science focused 
its energies on Artificial Intelligence and on theories of 
language and psychology that supported AI, grounding 
its theories implicitly in a metaphor of the mind as a 
computer, today’s cognitive scientists tend to 
concentrate instead on the more organic metaphor of 
the “embodiment” of mind, that is, of the mind’s 
substantive indebtedness to its bodily, social, and 
cultural contexts . . . all of which contribute to recasting 
human reason into a set of highly imaginative – not 
logical but figural – processes. (Hart 2001: 315)
N Katherine Hayles expands on the implications of such an 
epistemological shift for the philosophical tradition of Cartesian 
dualism, which valorises ratiocinative processes: 
If one accepts the fundamental continuity between 
body and mind, thought is essentially like all other 
physiology and behavior. Thinking, like excreting and 
ingesting, results from lively interactions of a being’s 
chemistry. Even “microbial” thinking derives from cell 
hunger, movement, growth, association, programmed 
death, satisfaction, and other intrinsica of all life. 
(Hayles 1996: 181)
Margulis and Sagan, further demystifying cogitation through a 
materialist grounding of the brain in the body, argue that all life is 
‘capable of choice, of decisions, of sensing and thinking. Such 
“thoughts”, both vague and clear, are physical. They are in the cells 
of our bodies and in those of other animals’ (Margulis & Saga 1997: 
181).  Those thoughts, as Hart emphasises above, are patterned as 
much by the social and cultural as the biological systems from within 
which our lives emerge.
This shift from viewing the human mind as some kind of 
autonomous, transcendental, cogitating machine to the embodied 
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mind has resulted in a concurrent revision of how consciousness is 
understood. Consciousness is no longer conceived as a ratiocinative 
‘self’ controlling things from somewhere inside the brain. As 
Damasio argues, there is no ‘homonculus’ (or proverbial ‘little man’) 
sitting in the brain, thinking and making decisions (Damasio 1999: 
11). Daniel Dennett, with whose research into consciousness 
Damasio engages, similarly argues that there is no ‘ghost in the 
machine’ (Dennett 1991: 35). In fact, consciousness arrives late by 
500 milliseconds, so that self-awareness is not even necessary to the 
brain’s capacity to make decisions and take action. Consciousness, 
Dennett suggests, is a ‘biological phenomenon – like metabolism or 
reproduction or self-repair’ (Dennett 1991: 57) that has a ‘recursive 
capacity’ (Dennett 2005: 174), enhancing the brain’s attentional and 
learning capacities, but it is not the privileged source of will or 
intentionality. Damasio concurs that consciousness provides ‘more
wakefulness and more-focused attention’ (Damasio 1999: 182) – a 
sense of ‘feeling’ in control (Damasio 2012a: 280) and of feeling like 
‘you’ (161) – rather than being paramount to decision-making and 
action. 
Such research effectively consigns most thought to the realm of the 
unconscious, radically expanding that category of the mind, as well 
as dispelling the mysticism and pathology with which it has been 
traditionally associated in the humanities. The unconscious is not 
created by repressed fears and desires, as psychoanalysis would have 
it; it is not some kind of subterraneous, tortured realm ready to be 
explored by the creative genius bravely seeking psychological truth. 
Rather, as Damasio puts it, the unconscious provides a vast and 
flexible ‘knowledge base’ (Damasio 2012a: 144) that is essential to 
‘life management’ (36). In fact, he argues: ‘our cognitive 
unconscious is capable of reasoning and has a larger “space” for 
operations than the conscious counterpart’ (275), which he portrays 
as ‘in-the-moment’ (276) and easily distracted [1]. This 
understanding of the dynamic between unconscious and conscious 
processing offers a fascinating explanation, as Damasio explicitly 
suggests, for the ‘aha’ moment typically ascribed to inspiration; if 
creativity feels as if it comes from ‘somewhere else’, it is because the 
creative product comes into conscious awareness after the 
unconscious ‘quiet delivery of the solution’ (276).
Stressing the centrality of unconscious functioning to the human 
organism, Dennett provocatively argues that there is no difference 
between a human and a zombie. Both are unconscious creatures and, 
as such, ‘behaviourally indistinguishable’ (Dennett 1991: 86). 
Damasio adds nuance to Dennett’s iconoclastic scenario, showing 
how the unconscious is educated according to ‘conscious intentions 
and goals’ (Damasio 2012a: 270). He also draws attention to the 
ways in which the brain stem, the primitive foundation of the modern 
brain, is fundamentally emotional so that human life-forms, unlike 
zombies but like most other organisms, are thus essentially 
emotional: ‘Primordial feelings are not only the first images 
generated by the brain but also immediate manifestations of 
sentience’ (2012a: 22). If there is a distinction to be made between a 
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human and a zombie – or a computer, which provides Damasio’s 
point of comparison (1999: 314) – that dissimilarity lies in the 
emotional nature of the embodied mind, which responds to the 
sensory environments in which we live. Indeed, for Damasio, feeling 
provides nothing less than ‘the backdrop for the mind, and, more 
specifically, the foundation for the elusive entity we designate as 
self’ (30). 
Damasio distinguishes between emotions, as ‘actions accompanied 
by ideas and certain modes of thinking’ (2012a: 110), and feelings, 
which he defines as ‘perceptions of what our bodies do during the 
emoting’ (110). According to Damasio, while emotions motivate 
simple and complex organisms alike, ‘states of emotional 
feeling’ (110) have developed only in more complex organisms such 
as humans and other mammals, bringing about consciousness of that 
emotional knowledge: ‘The organism no longer had mere feelings 
that could be felt; it had feelings that could be known’ (176). This is, 
for Damasio, the origins of consciousness, which comes with a 
‘definite quality, a valence, somewhere along the pleasure-to-pain 
range’ (185). Indeed, for Damasio it is that combination of emotion 
and feeling that provokes humans to engage in the creation of art. 
Poetically evoking a potential feeling-rich scene of creativity, he 
argues:
No set of conscious images of any kind and on any 
topic ever fails to be accompanied by an obedient choir 
of emotions and consequent feelings. As I am looking 
at the Pacific Ocean dressed in its morning suit, 
protected by a soft, gray sky, I am not just seeing, I am 
also emoting to this majestic beauty and feeling a 
whole array of physiological changes that translate, 
now that you ask, into a quiet state of well-being. 
(Damasio 2012a: 254)
While consciousness has facilitated introspection, Damasio stresses 
that to be conscious is to feel conscious of something or someone. 
Consciousness requires ‘two players, the organism and the object’, 
and it is principally about ‘the relationship those players hold’ (1999: 
133). For Damasio, consciousness is the felt knowledge that arises 
from your body’s mapping of itself vis-à-vis spatial objects; it 
‘materializes when you confront an object, construct a neural pattern 
for it, and discover automatically that the now-salient image of the 
object is formed in your perspective, belongs to you, and that you can 
even act on it’ (126). While Damasio’s discussion does not extend to 
the primary relationship between mothers and children, the cognitive 
scientist Shaun Gallagher, in How the Body Shapes the Mind, 
identifies the origins of the conscious self precisely in the moodful 
maternal dynamic. Invoking the mother-and-infant system of 
imitation and mutuality encapsulated by Dissanayake’s concept of 
‘motherese’, Gallagher argues that such ‘intermodal and 
intersubjective interaction’ emotionally enhances the ‘proprioception’ 
or bodily awareness (Gallagher 2005: 73) of the infant, leading to 
self-consciousness. It is a vision of healthful mutuality and
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individuation that contrasts starkly with Freud’s or Lacan’s theories 
of infant conflict and alienation, which might be seen to give 
expression to little more than tragic patriarchal fantasies of 
autogenesis. 
Damasio and Gallagher also agree on the embodied and 
intersubjective origins of language. For Damasio, the ‘moved’ and 
‘moving’ body is intrinsic to language development. He refers to 
clinical trials on stroke patients with akinetic mutism, whose motion 
impairment and emotional impairment are accompanied by 
speechlessness. By contrast, stroke patients with mobility impairment 
but without emotional impairment can feel their way back into words. 
Damasio also asserts that language development is dependent on 
mutuality and worldly embeddedness. He asks: ‘Is it plausible to 
think that language utterances could be created in individuals who 
had no sense of self, other, and surroundings?’ (Damasio 1999: 109) 
Gallagher further develops the ways in which early expressive 
movements and emotional vocalisations, of the kind seen in the 
interactive performances of motherese, provide the foundations for 
language acquisition (Gallagher 2005: 128). It is a view that relies, as 
Gallagher notes, on a condition of intersubjectivity (129). Once again 
evoking motherese, he argues: ‘The body generates a gestural 
expression. It is, however, another person who moves, motivates, and 
mediates this process. To say that language moves my body is 
already to say that other people move me’ (129).
The earlier articulation of embodied consciousness and language 
development by the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty is also 
useful to canvas at this stage [2]. For Merleau-Ponty, as for Damasio 
and Gallagher after him, the mind is embodied and, as such, shaped 
by motion and emotion. The mind also intrinsically belongs to what 
Merleau-Ponty describes as ‘the system ‘self-others-
things’” (Merleau-Ponty 1976: 57). Notably like a poet, Merleau-
Ponty often allows his language to encapsulate the moodful and 
immersed condition he ascribes to human beings. He writes, for 
instance: ‘Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the 
organism; it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes 
life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system’ (203). 
Merleau-Ponty also argues that language, as a product of the 
embodied mind, represents an embodied response to the world and 
therefore springs from motion and emotion. Speech is primarily a 
physical act; it is not about engaging with language on some ideal, 
cognitive plane, as the postmodernists might have it: ‘the speaking 
subject plunges into speech without imagining the words he is about 
to utter’; it is ‘a motor presence of the word which is not the 
knowledge of the word’ (403). Emotion is profoundly imbricated 
with motion and, as Merleau-Ponty argues, with language, which is 
fundamentally an ‘emotional’ response to the world (188). It is the 
body, as ‘the subject of perception’ (225), which invests words with 
their significance, before words become codified as signs (235). For 
example, he contends: ‘In so far as my hand knows hardness and 
softness, and my gaze knows the moon’s light, it is as a certain way 
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of linking up with the phenomenon and communicating with 
it’ (317). Focusing on the word ‘sleet’, he argues that:
the word’s meaning is not compounded of a certain 
number of physical characteristics belonging to the 
object; it is first and foremost the aspect taken on by 
the object in human experience, for example my 
wonder in the face of these hard, then friable, then 
melting pellets falling ready-made from the sky. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1976: 403) 
Merleau-Ponty is explicit in contesting idealist or alienated concepts 
of language: language ‘is not an attribute of external origin, in the 
sociologist’s sense’ (403). Evoking Romanticism’s interest in the 
poet’s felt immersion in a natural world, he writes: ‘I am a field, an 
experience’ that must ‘“have it out” with the world’ (406-7). It is part 
of the ‘irrational power’ (189) or emotional proclivity of the self, he 
argues, to communicate and seek mutuality – a proclivity that can 
only have originated with the maternal dyad.
The poetic nature of Merleau-Ponty’s prose provides me with a 
convenient way to return to this paper’s argument that the problem of 
creativity, when it comes to poetry in particular, might be 
satisfactorily illuminated in terms of paradigms emerging in the 
sciences. Rather than theorising creativity in terms of a mystical 
‘supra-rational’ activity, the genius of men, and originality – as per 
Romantic, psychoanalytic and postmodern traditions in the 
humanities – we might look to more empirically based but no less 
fascinating explanations in the sciences. Such explanations are 
compellingly and thoroughly consistent with the phenomenological 
interest of creative practitioners in expressiveness – an interest 
valorised by Romantic and psychoanalytic theories of creativity, if 
underplayed by postmodernism. However, considered in the 
theoretical contexts provided by sociobiology and the cognitive 
sciences, the ‘self-expressive’ is usefully deprived of the self-
aggrandising mystificatory tendencies of which Moffitt complains in 
his survey of enduring myths of creativity in the humanities (Moffitt 
2005: 14). Indeed, if we understand expressiveness in the light of 
sociobiology and cognitive science – while appreciating, as Moffitt 
suggests, that self-expression is no guarantee of cultural value (340) – 
emotional expressiveness becomes far less irritating. It becomes less 
a matter of the snobbery (216) and martyrdom (213) that Moffitt 
identifies, and more a matter of egalitarian and healthy compulsion. 
For Dissanayake and Damasio, the urge to be creative develops in 
emotional contexts of maternal mutuality and worldly embeddedness 
– an experience that is germane to us all – rather than within 
patriarchally conceived systems of supra-logic and alienation. 
Emotional expressiveness is central to the process. The research of 
Dissanayake and Damasio (as well as of their contemporaries) 
suggests that, to revise Descartes’ maxim, ‘I feel therefore I am’. 
Notably, in its lyric form, poetry is understood to be the narcissistic 
expression of the momentary experiences of the ‘felt I’ that Damasio 
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evokes as the phenomenological experience of embodied 
consciousness. Moffitt might complain that lyric poems, because of 
their association with self-expression, have become ‘increasingly 
incomprehensible to the degree that they become ever more private, 
and so inherently ever-more subjective … even functionally 
autistic’ (Moffitt 2005: 206). However, the practice of writing lyric 
poetry cannot be viewed as entirely narcissistic if we appreciate the 
intersubjective precondition of expressive articulation – something 
highlighted by postmodern poetry’s intertextual emphasis. Of course, 
as I have suggested, some examples of postmodern poetry might 
disavow lyricism and expressiveness. Thanks to the recursive 
function of consciousness, it is always the case that poets can refigure 
the qualities of their verse, perhaps even to occlude the feeling body 
in favour of a cognitive and alienated vision of themselves. 
Nevertheless, the embodied mind and its emotional language remain 
fundamental to poetic creativity – something that Dissanayake’s 
work in sociobiology and Damasio’s research in neuroscience 
confirms.
Conclusion
As suggested in the preliminaries to this paper, I am not advocating 
‘consilience’ or a methodological monism for the humanities based 
on new work in the sciences. I hope merely to highlight how 
epistemologies emerging in the sciences might enable us to rethink 
key issues pertinent to creativity in the humanities. Indeed, it is not 
even the case that challenging Romantic, psychoanalytic or 
postmodern ways of thinking about creativity implies rejecting them. 
I hope that my essay has suggested possibilities for a more materially 
grounded understanding of, for example, the ‘supra-rational’ quality 
mystified by the Romantics and psychoanalysis in connection with 
creative activity. There is also significant potential to begin 
reconceptualising the relationship between the unconscious and the 
conscious when it comes to creativity. What I would like to advocate 
here is an interdisciplinary approach to the problem of creativity that 
might best be encapsulated by the motif of Yeats’s ‘long-legged fly’, 
which touches lightly upon the profound stream of ideas – a stream 
that passes through many different disciplines, just as it passes, in 
Yeats’s’ poem, through the minds of many different creative 
personalities. Might the light touch of the long-legged fly provide an 
image for an interdisciplinary methodology that tests new 
possibilities, rather than remaining fixed to one stream of 
knowledge?
Notes
[1] While consciousness is a transient occurrence, it seems continuous and stable, 
as Damasio argues, because it is ‘renewed again and again thanks to anything that 
comes from outside the brain into its sensory machinery or anything that comes 
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from the brain’s memory stores towards sensory, motor, or autonomic 
recall’ (1999: 172). return to text
[2] While Damasio has been criticized for neglecting the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
he addresses the connections between their work in ‘Mind, Body, and Mental 
Illness’ (Damasio 1998). return to text
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